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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
__ 
In The Matter of RONDELL JOHNSON. 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
ANDREA D. EVANS, CHAIRMAN/CEO 
BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Appearances : 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-10-ST1691 Index No. 3323-10 
Rondell Johnson 
Inmate No. 98-B- 1583 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Southport Correctional Facility 
236 Institution Road 
P.O. Box 2000 
Pine City, N Y 14871 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Brian J. O’Donnell, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISION/ORDER/JUDGMENT 
Georee B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Southport Correctional Facility, has commenced the 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determifiahm of respondent dated June 2, 
2009 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving an 
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indeterminate term of imprisonment of ten to twenty years on a conviction of the crime of 
first degree burglary, with a concurrent term of two and one half to five years for second 
degree assault. Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, petitioner indicates that 
the respondent failed to timely issue a decision with respect to his administrative appeal. He 
maintains that the sole factor the Commissioners considered was the seriousness of the 
offenses for which he is incarcerated. In his view, the Parole Board failed to consider other 
factors under Executive Law tj 2594. He maintains that the actions of the Parole Board were 
tantamount to a re-sentencing. The petitioner points olit that he has completed several 
programs during the course of his incarceration, including AKT, ASATRSAT, pre-GED and 
GED. While incarcerated he has served as a porter and a student in independent study. In 
his words, he has “never refused a program”. His post-release plan is to live with his mother 
in Rochester, New York. He is a fitness trainer and plans, upon being released, to be 
employed in a gym. With regard to the seriousness of his offenses, he contends that he has 
served an excessive amount of time (over 1 1 years) for his crimes, particularly since he only 
shot his victim in the wrist; and that in any event the seriousness of his crimes may not 
properly serve as the sole basis for denial of release. The petitioner maintains that the parole 
interview was carried out in an improper manner in that it was conducted by video 
conference rather than having him personally appear before the Parole Board. He contends 
that this deprived him of his right to confront and cross-examination witnesses and his 
“accusers”. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
are sct forth 3s follow: 
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“After a review of the record and interview, the Panel has 
determined that if released at this time there is a reasonable 
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without 
again violating the law and your release would be incompatible 
with the welfare of society and would so deprecate the serious 
nature of the crime as to undermine respect for the law. This 
decision is based on the following factors: Your 1 .0 . ’~  idare 
burglary lst and assault 2d in which you entered a dwelling 
while armed with a gun and shot the victim. Then while 
incarcerated you acted in concert and caused physical injury to 
a victim. Note is made of your sentencing minutes, poor 
disciplinary record and all required factors. You continue to 
have serious disciplinary problems, a poor parole plan and have 
continued drug related issues. Parole is denied.” 
As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
representative [I” (Executive Law 9259-i [2] [c] [A]). 
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept., 
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3d Dept., 
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200 13). If the Parole Board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory requirements, 
the Board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 
supra). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part 
of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of 
Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which 
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. 
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming, his “somewhat” improved disciplinary 
record, and his plans upon release. He was afforded ample time to make a statement in 
support of his release. The decision was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the 
reasons for the denial of parole and it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $2594 
(see Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773 [2008]; Matter of Whiteheadv. Russi, 20 1 AD2d 825 
[3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 
[3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the 
seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York 
State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v New 
York State Board of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 
863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s criminal history (G l ? ; ~ t t ~ + r  ofFarid v Trwi?, 
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239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 
19981). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor 
that it considered in determining the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one 
(see Matter of Y w ~ o  v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 1681 113” Dept., 20101; 
Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 20081). Nor 
must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence of 
Executive Law 6 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd 
Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable 
weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a 
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other 
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty 
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare 
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to 
undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v Rcii 1 ULA SLJLC Bib i w i i  ui I’duuI~, 3 
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations 
omitted). 
With regard to petitioner’s claim that the determination to deny parole is tantamount 
to a re-sentencing, the Court finds the assertion to be factually unsupported, conclusory and 
without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York State Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rd 
Dept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive Department Board of Appeals 
Unit, 28 1 AD2d 672 [3rd Dept., 200 11; Matter of Evans v Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. 
Ct., Westchester Co., 20061). The fact that an inmate has served his or her minimum 
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sentence does not confer upon the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release (see 
Matter of Motti v Alexander, 54 AD3d 11 14, 11 15 [3rd Dept., 20081). The Parole Board is 
vested with the discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the 
fact that the sentencing court set the minimum term of petitioner’s sentence (see Matter of 
Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of Cody v Dennison, 33 AD2d 1141, 
1142 [3rd Dept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 
AD3d 930 [3rd Dept., 20071). 
With respect to petitioner’s argument that the Appeals Unit failed to issue a timely 
decision, the Court observes that such a failure does not operate to invalidate the underlying 
administrative decision. The sole consequence is to permit the petitioner to deem his or her 
administrative remedy to be exhausted, and enable the petitioner to immediately seek judicial 
review of the underlying determination (see 9 NYCRR 4 8006.4 [c]; Graham v New York 
State Division of Parole, 269 AD2d 628 [3rd Dept, 20001, lv denied 95 NY2d 753; People ex 
rel. Tyler v Travis, 269 AD2d 636 [3rd Dept., 20001; Matter of Mentor v New York State 
Division of Parole, 67 AD3d 1108 [3rd Dept., 20091). 
In addition, the Parole Board’s decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board’s discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta 
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 
NY2d 604). 
With respect to petitioner’s objection to conducting the parole interview by video 
confLarc.nce, it is well settled that “the use of teleconferencing technology in conducting a 
parole interview ‘is consistent with the statutory requirement that petitioner be “personally 
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interview[ed]’”” (Mack v Travis, 283 AD2d 700, 701 [3d Dept., 20011, app dismissed 96 
NY2d 896 [200 11, quoting Matter of Vanier v Travis, 274 AD2d 797,798, quoting Executive 
Law 9 2594 [2] [a]; see also Matter of Webb v Travis, 26 AD3d 614 [3d Dept. 20061). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the 
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order, 
is sealing all records submitted for in camera review. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original 
decision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are 
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this 
decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute 
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable 
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
ENTER 
Dated: December a ,2010 
Troy, New York Supreme Court Justice 







Order To Show Cause dated June 28,2010, Petition, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
Respondent’s Answer dated September 22,20 10, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of RONDELL JOHNSON, 
-against- 
ANDREA D. EVANS, CHAIRMAN/CEO 
BOARD OF PAROLE, 
For A Judgment Puixuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Petitioner, 
Respondent, 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-10-ST1691 Index No. 3823-10 
SEALING ORDER 
The following documents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in 
camera review in connection with the above matter, namely, respondent’s Exhibit B, 
Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent’s Exhibit D, Confidential Portion of Inmate 
Status Report, it is hereby 
ORDERED, that the foregoing designated documents, including all duplicates and 
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person or 
public or private agency unless by further order of the Court. 
ENTER 
Dated: December , 2 0  10 
Troy, New York upreme Court Justice 
George B. Ceresia, Jr. 
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